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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
RENTS AND RENTAL VALUES TAXABLE
AS INCOME
By JAMES MORFIT MULLEN*
What is, or is not income has disturbed judicial thought
for a long time. Many courts have pondered deeply to de-
cide whether stock dividends go as income to the life tenant
or as capital to the remainderman. Gains and losses in
the sale of capital assets are matters which have per-
plexed both legislatures and courts. So also the apparently
simple topic of rents and rental values, as subjects for
income taxation, has given rise to much discussion and
difference of opinion.
Before taking up the liability of any species of prop-
erty to income taxation, it might be well to consider what
legislative bodies mean by income, when they are about
to tax it. The Federal, State, and British courts have dif-
ferent points of view about their fundamental concepts.
This is largely due to the deeper legal ideologies from
which these several tribunals proceed.
The Supreme Court of the United States has defined
income in many cases. The two leading cases are Eisner v.
Macomber' (the stock dividend case) and Merchant's Loan
and Trust Co. v. Smietanka2 (which involved profits and
losses from the sale of capital assets). In them, this is
said: 3
"'Income may be defined as the gain derived from
capital, from labor, or from both combined,' provided
it be understood to include profit gained through a sale
or conversion of capital assets . . ."
In defining income as just quoted, the Supreme Court
went back to the Corporation Excise Taxing Act of 1909,
and decided that the type of income intended by the Six-
* Of the Baltimore City Bar. A.B., 1899, Johns Hopkins University;
LL.B., 1906, University of Maryland.1 252 U. S. 189, 64 L. Ed. 521, 40 S. Ct. 189 (1920).
255 U. S. 509, 65 L. Ed. 751, 41 S. Ct. 386 (1921).
252 U. S. 189, 207, 64 L. Ed. 521, 529, 40 S. Ct. 189, 193 (1920); 255
U. S. 509, 517-518, 65 L. Ed. 751, 755, 41 S. Ct. 386, 388 (1921).
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teenth Amendment was that income referred to in the
1909 Corporation Law. In the decisions under the 1909 law,
the income tax legislated upon was one "taxing the doing
of business in corporate form."'
Thus, the Federal courts, in their conclusions about
what is income, begin with a constitutional limitation found
in the Sixteenth Amendment, in the single word "income",
to which the Supreme Court has given a specialized mean-
ing.
While the State courts have to deal variously with lim-
itations arising from the due process clause, from other
provisions in the Federal constitution, and from the cus-
tomary requirement of uniformity found in the State con-
stitutions, they have no such restrictions as the Federal
courts find themselves under as a result of the Sixteenth
Amendment.
Long before either the Federal or the State courts were
bothered with any income tax controversies, the State
courts had to determine, in stock dividend cases, what
was income and what was capital. In such decisions their
conclusions were radically different from what the Su-
preme Court determined. For instance, the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland, in 1902, decided that, as between life
tenant and remainderman, profits from the sale of capital
assets were not income.5 This ruling, with others of a
similar nature, was cited to the Supreme Court in the
Smietanka case, but that learned tribunal discarded the
State ideas on the subject, as well as those of the British
cases.
The State courts, in defining "income" for tax purposes,
have commonly used the Supreme Court's phrase "gains
derived from capital or labor, or both combined" without
including therein gains and losses in the sale of capital
assets.6
"Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Company, 247 U. S. 179, 62 L. E~d. 1054, 38
S. Ct. 467 (1918).
5 Smith v. Hooper, 95 Md. 16, 31, 54 A. 95 (1902).
6 See collection of cases in Prentice-Hall State and Local Tax Service,
See. 91224.
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Of course, an apt place of beginning in examining State
laws to determine what is income is to see what the par-
ticular statute includes or excludes as a subject for taxa-
tion. Thus the first (and temporary) Maryland Income
Tax Law, passed at a special session of the Legislature in
1937,7 included gains and losses from the sale of capital
assets in the gross income liable to the tax. The presently
applicable (permanent) Maryland Income Tax Law of
19398 omitted this possible subject of income taxation.
The court of last resort of Wisconsin, in dealing with
an unique situation (later herein to be discussed in detail)
arising out of an income tax law of that State, said:'
"Income must be money or that which is convert-
ible into money."
The English income tax law does not in terms define
what is income, but the House of Lords has stated that
the income to be taxed is "money or money's worth."'10
These varying concepts as to what is income result in
similarly varying conclusions in connection with some
aspects of the topic of income taxes upon rents and rental
values, herein to be discussed.
In discussing the availability of rental values for in-
come taxation, the subject will be considered in its three
aspects:
I. When real estate is leased for a term or other-
wise for the payment of rent.
II. When the taxpayer receives compensation,
either partly or entirely, in the use of a dwelling or
other real estate.
III. When the owner of real estate does not lease
it, but occupies it himself.
' Md. Sp. Laws 1937, Ch. 11, Sec. 216.
s Md. Code .(1939) Art. 81, Secs. 222-258, as amended by Md. Laws 1941,
Ch. 36.
State ex rel. Bolens, v. Frear, 148 Wisc. 456, 134 N. W. 673, 135 N. W.
164 (1912).
10 Tennant v. Smith, (1892) A. C. 150. See Irish Law Times, November
30, 1940, 311.
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I.
RENTALS PAID IN CASH
The term "real estate," as used in this article as a sub-
ject for leasing, is intended to include that form of personal
property customarily known in Maryland as "chattels
real." These leasehold estates result from the creation of
ground rents by a system of 99 year leases renewable for-
ever.
This particular division of our subject gives rise to
little difficulty. The Federal Income Tax Law, and the
State law generally, include "rents" under the gross income
to be taxed.
The presently applicable (permanent) Maryland In-
come Tax Law1 made a noteworthy discrimination in this
respect. The act creates two kinds of income. One is
called "ordinary income", which is taxable at 2% (for-
merly 2 %), and the other is called "investment income,
which is taxable at 5% (formerly 6% ).12 For some reason,
"ground rents" created under Maryland law by 99 year
leases renewable forever, are in the 5% class; all other
kinds of leases, including the ordinary demising of a dwell-
ing house, are placed in the 2% class. In a case brought
to test the constitutionality of this law, the Maryland Court
of Appeals decided that this classification was not so arbi-
trary as to make the act invalid.13
The only pertinent question that has arisen under this
section has been the usually simple one of what is "rent";
or whether or not the arrangement between the owner of
real estate and the occupier thereof gives rise to a situation
under which the owner of the real estate receives compen-
sation which is taxable as rent.
Some typical holdings in this connection follow: Royal-
ties for minerals removed under a mining lease made be-
fore the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment have been
11 Md. Code (1939) Art. 81, Sees. 222-258, as amended Md. Laws 1941,
Ch. 36.
2The rates as fixed in Md. Code (1939) Art. 81, Sec. 230, were changed
as indicated in the text by Md. Laws 1941, Ch. 36.
1 Oursler v. Tawes, 178 Md. 471, 13 A. (2d) 763 (1940).
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held taxable as income. 4 In the case of a lease providing
that the lessee should pay the lessor's net income tax on
the avails of the lease, the value of such taxes has been
held taxable income.
15
Improvements constructed by a lessee pursuant to the
requirements of a lease will not be deemed rent taxable
as income to the lessor, unless there is plainly disclosed
an intent that they shall be such.'6 Where rentals are
assigned by the lessor, and he retains title to the corpus
producing the income, the rentals are taxable to the as-
signor as his income.'
Sometimes, corporations lease valuable properties and
provide in the agreements for the payment of the rentals
directly to the stockholders. Whether these rentals may
be taxed as income to the corporation depends upon the
details of the transaction.' s
Advance rentals paid under a 99 year lease are income
in the year when received. It is for Congress to decide
whether amortization should be allowed. 9
Where a taxpayer conveyed residence property to a
family corporation, and provided for payment of taxes
thereon from other property, also given to the corporation,
the rental value of the property, which was less than the
taxes, was held not taxable income.2" In that case the
Court discussed what the effect would have been if the
rental value were in excess of the taxes. By way of dictum
it said that no obligation to pay rent for use of premises
would be involved in a family transaction, unless there
was one by reason of an express stipulation.
"I Banker's Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Burnet, 287 U. S. 308, 77 L. Ed. 325,
53 S. Ct. 150 (1932). See also note, 74 A. L. R. 183.
15 U. S. v. Boston and Maine R. Co., 279 U. S. 732, 73 L. Ed. 929, 49
S. Ct. 505 (1929).
20Blatt Co. v. U. S., 305 U. S. 267, 83 L. Ed. 167, 59 S. Ct. 186 (1938).
See also Hewitt Realty Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 76 F.
(2d) 880, 98 A. L. R. 1201 (C. C. A.. 2d; 1935) ; and note 98 A. L. R. 1207.
11 Ward v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 58 F. (2d) 757 (C. C. A.
9th, 1932).
18 Gold and Stock Telegraph Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
83 F. (2d) 465 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) ; and Louisville, H. and St. L. Ry. Co.
v. U. S., 20 F. Supp. 483 (D. C. W. D. Ky. 1937).9 Renwick v. U. S., 87 F. (2d) 123 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936)
20 Hillman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 71 F. (2d) 688 (C. C.
A. 3rd, 1934).
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It has been held that a mortgagee in possession of prop-
erty for foreclosure purposes is not liable to income tax
on the rents received which go in reduction of the debt.2'
Rentals taxable as income under state laws have been
judicially declared applicable to royalties to mine lessors,
rental income to beneficiaries from realty devised in trust,
payments to farmers under the Federal A. A. A., and in
other like cases.22
Rentals from real property outside the taxing state were
formerly held not taxable, but the latest decision of the
Suprerme Court of the United States is to the effect that
they are taxable if jurisdiction exists over the person of
the taxpayer.28 In two English decisions, 24 it was held
that the annual value of the right to occupy property given
by will, rent free, is taxable as income.
II.
RENTS ALLOWED IN LIEu OF, OR AS PART OF COMPENSATION
Practically all income tax laws (both Federal and
State) include as a subject for taxation "compensation for
services." These laws may vary in their treatment of such
sources of taxation, variously treating them as "earned
income," "ordinary income," or otherwise, but under all
of them many different kinds of questions arise.
For example: A hotel manager is furnished a suite in
the hotel employing him. A college professor is given a
house on the college campus. An army officer has quarters
furnished to him or, in lieu of this, he gets commutation
of heat, light, and quarters in cash. A minister is given
a manse to occupy. What is the liability of these specialists
to be taxed on the species of property which their em-
ployment furnishes them?
Seen from the point of view of general law, it seems
a sound principle to regard board furnished as part com-
21 Hadley Falls Trust Co. v. U. S., 22 F. Supp. 346 (D. C. D. Mass., 1988).
22 See Prentice-Hall State and Local Tax Service, Sec. 91272.
23 New York, ex re]. Cohn, v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308, 81 L. Ed. 666, 57 S.
Ct. 466, 108 A. L. R. 721 (1937).
21 Shanks v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (192) 1 K. B. 342; Sut-
ton v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1929) 45 Times L. Rep. 565.
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pensation as another form of wages, with all consequent
benefits and liabilities. For instance, in Workmen's Com-
pensation cases, the award allowed an injured servant
may, in a proper case, be based upon the entire compen-
sation, part of which is in cash and part of which is in
board and lodging.25
Ministers as a class are notoriously under-paid. They
are not, however, to be regarded as entirely under-privi-
leged, in view of the attitude of the Federal Income Tax
laws toward them. In 1921, Congress, in the Income Tax
Law of that year26 first provided among the "exclusions
from gross income":
"Ministers-The rental value of a dwelling house
and appurtenances thereof furnished to a Minister of
the Gospel as part of his compensation."
This exemption has been preserved in all subsequent
Federal Income Tax laws. The provision seems clear. It
has not been judicially construed, although the Internal
Revenue Department has made some rulings as to its scope,
including one deciding that a missionary claiming the bene-
fit of this exemption must be an ordained minister.
The department further ruled that where a church
made an allowance to its minister to cover the cost of a
parsonage, the exemption did not apply, but that the ex-
penses attributable to the portion of the parsonage devoted
to professional use might be deducted.
No other class of persons has any specific statutory
exemption for housing in the Federal law, nor does this
law provide for any specific inclusion of the use of realty
as gross income taxable against the taxpayer.
Early in the history of the Federal income tax law,
the Internal Revenue Department made an effort to collect
Federal income taxes upon the cash commutation of quar-
ters allowed to Army officers in lieu of the furnishing of
actual quarters. Then, as now, the Federal income tax
25 Picanardi v. Emerson Hotel Co., 135 Md. 92, 108 A. 483 (1919), which
held, however, that the value of the board could not be considered in
awarding compensation unless a value had been fixed between employer
and employee at the time of hiring.
26Now 26 U. S. C. A. 22(b) (6).
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law included under gross income taxes "compensation for
personal services."
In 1925 the Court of Claims decided that this allowance
by way of commutation was not taxable, under the salu-
tary principle that, when the residence or other lodging
furnished the taxpayer is in a specific place for the partic-
ular benefit of the employer, rather than as compensation
for specific services, the taxpayer is not liable for this al-
lowance as income.17  There have been several later de-
cisions by the Board of Tax Appeals in which the principle
of this ruling has been applied to varying states of facts.2 8
In the Benaglia case, the Board of Tax Appeals held
that board and lodging allowed the manager of Hawaiian
Hotels and his wife was not by way of compensation for
services, but was for the convenience of the employer, and
so was not taxable. While there was dissent from this in
the Board, yet an appeal from the ruling was dismissed
upon petition. 9
In the Chandler and Fox cases, the rental values of
buildings furnished to officers of business corporations
were found to be as compensation for services, and taxable
as such.
The present regulations of the Internal Revenue De-
partment in terms accept and express the general princi-
ples of the Clifford Jones case. But their practices in some
connections seem at variance with their accepted dogma;
we say this particularly about the departmental practices
as to the housing furnished college presidents and profes-
sors. These cases are distinguished with difficulty from
those of Army officers. In both situations the performance
of duty requires the presence of the taxpayers at the place
where their respective employers need their services. In
some instances of college professors required to live on the
campus, the standard of accommodations makes the re-
quirement more of a personal liability to the occupant
17 Clifford Jones v. U. S., 60 Ct. Cl. Rep. 552.
28 Fox v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 30 B. T. A. 451 (1934);
Benaglia v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 36 B. T. A. 838 (1937);
and Chandler v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 41 B. T. A. 165 (1940).
21 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Benaglia, 97 F. (2d) 996 (C. C.
A.. 9th, 1938).
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than real compensation. This accentuates the persuasive
force of the claim that the Army officer rule should apply
equally to such college professors.
In addition to the court and tax board decisions, there
have been departmental rulings in which the housing of
seamen, hospital employees, plantation managers, as well
as a State Governor's mansion have been determined not
liable to income taxation. In the case of domestic servants,
there have been rulings both ways. Civilian employees
of the Federal government have been ruled to be taxable
on the value of quarters furnished to them."
The British decisions (which have not, however, been
generally followed in this country in determining what is
income) take a point of view similar to that of the Jones
case, but add a clearer test of taxability.1
In Tennant v. Smith, the House of Lords had before
it for decision whether or not an agent of a bank who, as
part of his duty as "custodier", occupied a house upon the
bank premises, was liable for an income tax upon the rental
value. The house was part of larger premises belonging
to the bank and used for banking business. The "cus-
todier" could not rent the house, nor use it for other than
bank business.
The House of Lords decided that this rental value was
not liable to the income tax. Lord Halsbury put his view
on the money or money's worth principle, and said :32
"Of course, the possession of a house which may
be used for purposes of profit is property and taxable
as such."
In the case of Corke v. Fry,33 the Court held that a
minister's right to occupy a manse forms a part of his
income, and the annual rental value thereof must be as-
sessed as income under the English law. This decision
was made in 1895, long before any war exigencies required
exhaustive efforts to develop new sources of taxes. It
30 See Prentice-Hall Federal Tax Service, Sees. 7727, 7733-34.
S1 Tennant v. Smith (1892) A. C. 150; Corke v. Fry (1895) 32 Scottish
L. Rep. 341.
82 (1892) A. C. 150, 154.
3"3Supra, n. 31.
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was decided upon the question of the right of the minister
to let the manse, in lieu of occupying it himself, should
he so determine. The rationale of the decision was that
when one occupied a residence furnished him as part of
his compensation, and which he could rent at a profit to
himself if he should so elect, the occupancy of the building
was a source of property from which a profit could be
made.
The British decisions furnish a test of liability to taxa-
tion which could very well be applied to the case of col-
lege professors, and for their benefit. If the houses they
occupy must be occupied by them in the performance of
their official duties, they cannot be rented, and there is
no species of property furnished to them capable of pro-
ducing income.
We have found no collection of State court rulings on
this subject; and there is no reason to believe that such
decisions, if existing, would extend or modify the Federal
attitude on this subject, except so far as the State income
tax laws may be differently framed. We are informed,
in this latter connection, that the Maryland taxing authori-
ties require ministers to include the rental values of their
manses in "gross income", for the reason that the Maryland
income tax law does not afford to ministers the exemption
as to leasing which the Federal law furnishes.
Upon principle, we suggest that the right of ministers
of the Gospel to be relieved from the burden of this taxa-
tion, apart from specific statutory exemption, perhaps is
different from the case of Army officers as passed upon in
the Clifford Jones case, or even of college professors re-
quired to live on the campus. But the same tests of lia-
bility vel non should apply to them.
III.
RENTAL VALUE OF REAL ESTATE OCCUPIED BY THE OWNER
This possible source of taxation raises a question of
abstract justice, about which the Supreme Court of the
United States and the court of last resort of Wisconsin have
expressed different points of view.
396 [VOL. V
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A man owns a single piece of residence property. In
the one case, he elects to rent it, and he is taxed upon his
net rental, as income. In the other case, he decides to
occupy it himself. Theoretically, at least, while he pays
himself no rent, he owns a capital asset which is capable
of producing a profit in money. Exact economic parity
would require that he be taxed upon the rental value of
his house, to the same extent as the man who does not
occupy his own house, but whose rental value is expressed
in exact cash figures.
The United States Supreme Court, in 1934, decided
tersely and emphatically that the rental value of a building
occupied by the owner is not income within the meaning
of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.3
The 1921 Revenue Act" made a special provision for
the income of life insurance companies. In the description
of gross income, "rents" were included. In the section
providing for "deductions", allowance was made for taxes,
repairs, and obsolescence. Section 24536 of the Act pro-
vided that these deductions were "not allowable unless
there is included in the return of gross income the rental
value of the space so occupied."
The insurance company in the above cited case claimed
allowance for taxes, etc., under the Act in question. The
company owned a building, a part of which it occupied
and a part of which it rented. The Commissioner directed
that the rental value of the occupied portion of the prop-
erty be included as income. The company resisted this
ruling on the ground that the rental value was not income
within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution, and that this amounted to a direct
tax. The Supreme Court agreed with this contention, and
said: 3 7
"The rental value of the building used by the owner
does not constitute income within the meaning of the
Sixteenth Amendment."
8, Helvering v. Independent Life Insurance Co., 292 U. S. 371, 78 L. Ed.
1311, 54 S. Ct. 758 (1934).
542 Stat. L. 261, Sec. 245.
' Ibid.
'" 292 U. S. 871, 379, 78 L. Ed. 1311, 1314, 54 S. Ct. 758, 759-60 (1984).
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The Court held, however, that the company was not
required to include in the gross any amount to cover the
rental value of the space used by it, and that the statute
did not require the inclusion of rental value as income;
it only provided conditions under which the deductions
should be made. It was held no objection to making as
a condition allowing certain deductions that the rental
values of the building out of which the deductions grew
should be included. While the general principle was sus-
tained that rental value is not income, yet the particular
statute was not invalid.
Since this case, the phraseology of the provision of the
law taxing the income of life insurance companies has been
changed and now reads 8 that the deductions, allowances
for taxes, etc., are limited to an amount which bears the
same ratio as the rental value of the space not so occupied
bears to the rental value of the entire property.
The case of Rockford Life Insurance Company v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue 9 makes a similar ruling
based upon the decision in the Independent Life Insurance
Company case.
These cases are, however, an explicit decision that such
rental value of real estate is not income taxable as such
within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court, in reaching its
conclusion, cites the line of decisions of which Eisner v.
Macomber 0 is the first and parent case. -
Wisconsin looked at the matter differently, and decided
that the rental value of a residence occupied by the owner
was taxable as income.41
The Wisconsin tax law of 1911 included as a basis of
taxation "all rent of real estate, including estimated rental
of residence property occupied by the owner." The Wis-
consin Supreme Court considered the effect of the quoted
statutory provision, and concluded that such a provision
was necessary under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
8 Now 26 U. S. C. A. 203(B).
39292 U. S. 382, 78 L. Ed. 1315, 54 S. Ct. 761 (1934).
40 Supra, n. 1.41 S pra, n. 9.
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Federal Constitution to provide for equality of income
taxation between the owners of residence property not
occupied by them, but rented; and that not rented, but
occupied by the owner. The opinion of the Court contained
the following: 42
"In this connection, though not perhaps in its log-
ical order may be considered the exception to that pro-
vision of the Act which directs that the estimated
rental of residence property occupied by the owner
shall be considered as income. It is said that this is
not income, and that calling it income does not make
it income. It may be conceded that things which are
not in fact income cannot be made such by mere legis-
lative fiat, yet it must also be conceded, we think, that
income in its general sense need not necessarily be
money. Clearly, it must be money or that which is
convertible into money. The Century Dictionary de-
fines it as that which comes in to a person or payment
for labor or services rendered in some office, or as gain
from lands, business, the investment of capital, etc.
This clause was doubtless inserted in an effort to
equalize the situation of two men each possessed of a
house of equal rental value, one of whom rents his
house to a tenant, while the other occupies his house
himself. Under the clause in question, the two men
with like property are placed upon an equal footing,
and in no other way apparently can that be done.
Under the English income tax laws, it has been held
that where a man has a residence or right of residence
which he can turn into money if he chooses, and he
occupies the residence himself, the annual value of
the rental forms part of his income. Corke v. Fry, 32
Scottish Law Report, 341. We discover no objection
to that provision in question."
This Wisconsin case is cited in later decisions43 of that
Court to support the parent proposition that income is not
only money, but also that which is convertible into money.
A Federal case" has cited it for the same purpose.
12 Supra, n. 9, 148 Wisc. 456, 512-513, 134 N. W. 673, 691.
18 Lawrence v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 213 Wlsc. 273, 251 N. W. 242
(1933); and Zweife] v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 214 Wise. 223, 252
N. W. 586 (1934).
"Richardson v. Conway, 49 F. (2d) 554, 555 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931).
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Conversely, it was argued in a case' brought to de-
termine the constitutionality of the Maryland Income Tax
Law of 1939, that uniformity under the State constitu-
tional provision required that occupiers of residence prop-
erty should pay an income tax upon the rental value of
such property. The Maryland Court of Appeals upheld
the act in question, but did not discuss this objection in
its opinion.
Uniformity from the point of view of constitutional
requirements may not be the same thing as when viewed
from considerations of economic parity. When A owns a
house and lives in it, he has capital invested in a resi-
dence which, therefore, he occupies free of rent. If B, who
owns the same amount of capital, decides not to invest it
in a house, but puts it in interest paying securities, he
can use the interest therefrom for payment of his rent.
Manifestly, if these two men are to be in the same tax-
paying category, both should pay taxes on the income,
received or receivable from the invested capital, one on
the income actually received from his securities, the other
on the rent he in effect pays himself by the occupancy of
his own house. The latter is the "money or money's worth"
idea.
To say that constitutional requirements of equality of
taxation cannot reach the exactness of economic considera-
tions, evades the question. And such a thought is, more-
over, inaccurate, because all income tax laws try to pro-
duce economic equality viewed from the standpoint of
the taxpayer's economic situation, when they provide dif-
ferent exemptions for single and married persons, and
additional exemptions for other dependents than a wife.
In connection with this latter idea, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania has decided that an income tax law which
provides different exemptions for married and single per-
sons lacks the uniformity required of such laws by the
Pennsylvania constitution and so is unconstitutional. 4
45Oursler v. Tawes, supra, n. 13.
"Kelley v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. St. 180, 181 A. 598 (1935).
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In Eisner v. Macomber,4 7 and in the other Federal de-
cisions dealing with income, the Supreme Court concluded
that the Sixteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution
had in mind the kind of income contemplated by the Cor-
poration Excise Tax of 1909, and held, in effect, that the
meaning of income as so defined was to that extent special-
ized.
In the later case of Merchant's Loan and Trust Co. v.
Smietanka, 8 this idea was elaborated and the Supreme
Court specifically excluded as a basis for its decision the
State decisions in connection with whether or not stock
dividends, gains from the sale of capital assets, etc., were
income as between life tenant and remainderman. It also
rejected the British decisions, which are "interpretations
of statutes so wholly different in their wording" as to be
without value.
It seems a fair comment to make in connection with
the conflict between the ideas of the Supreme Court, as
in the Independent Life Insurance Company case,49 and
those of the Wisconsin court in its income tax cases, that
State courts have a right to consider income from their
stand upon the broad ground in accordance with the gen-
erally accepted ideas of what is income in the other cases.
They are not limited in their contemplation of this subject
in the way that the Supreme Court felt itself bound in
defining income in the Smietanka case, specifically as re-
stricted by the rationale of the definition of income in cases
arising under the Corporation Excise Tax Acts of 1909.
Of course, one can conceive that income, as viewed
from the point of view solely of a stockholder of a cor-
poration, might be thought of differently than in more gen-
eral connections. For instance, the stockholders of a cor-
poration contribute a specified amount, which constitutes
capital. If a part of this specified amount invested in a
piece of real estate is sold at a profit, the surplus over the
amount actually representing capital could be regarded
'S Supra, n. 2.
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as income payable to the stockholders. Such a conception,
however, should not control the general meaning of income,
looked at from all standpoints.
The difference between the views of the Supreme Court
of the United States in the Independent Life Insurance
Company case, and those of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
in Bolens v. Frear° are based upon the different constitu-
tional limitations of the Federal fundamental law and a
State constitution, which latter limits the taxation of in-
come only to requirements of uniformity, or, as someone
has defined the Equal Protection Clause, to the English-
man's idea of fair play in sports.
60 Supra, n. 9.
